Maximizing Infrastructure Resilience to Deliberate Attacks:
Defender-Attacker-Defender Models and Algorithms
Matt Carlyle
Professor, Operations Research Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Wednesday, October 24
4:15 - 5:15 PM
Y2E2, Room 101
Abstract:
In this talk I discuss “Defender-Attacker-Defender” mathematical models of infrastructure resilience that explicitly account for both the function that an infrastructure system provides (e.g., electric power delivery, highway traffic conveyance, or fuel delivery) and the actions of a deliberate, malicious adversary to disrupt the function of that system. I will briefly discuss how these models complement risk-based methods that have been developed by others, and how our models can provide different guidance to high-level decision makers looking to increase the resilience of large infrastructure systems by redesigning them or reinforcing particular components in them. I’ll also discuss the reformulations and decomposition algorithms we use to solve these models, and then summarize the results of developing and solving one such model for defending and hardening bridges and highway segments to protect commuter traffic patterns in the San Francisco Bay Area.
Operations Research Colloquia: http://or.stanford.edu/oras_seminars.html