Farsighted game theoretic solution concepts have been shown to provide insightful results in many applications. However, we provide simple examples demonstrating that existing solution concepts may not be sufficiently farsighted, and in this talk we will present a new farsighted solution concept, the Subgame Perfect Consistent Set (SPCS). Based on von Neumann Morgenstern type stability and subgame perfect equilibrium, this solution is shown to lead to more satisfactory predictions in many situations as compared to existing myopic or farsighted solution concepts. Strikingly, the SPCS is shown to always achieve Pareto efficiency in farsighted normal form games. This result is demonstrated in various competitive settings, and is shown to imply, for example, that players who follow the SPCS reasoning are always able to share the monopolistic profit in Bertrand and Cournot competition settings, and are always able to achieve coordination and Pareto efficiency in decentralized supply chain settings, even when they are unable to form coalitions. This is joint work with Eran Hanany of Tel Aviv University.