Designing Collusion Resistant Mechanisms
Jason Hartline
Microsoft Research
Wednesday, February 2, 2005
4:45 - 5:45 PM
Terman Engineering Center, Room 453
Abstract:
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive
property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy
that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. For
single parameter agents, we give a characterization that essentially
restricts such mechanisms to those that post a "take it or leave it"
price to for each agent in advance. We then consider relaxing the
incentive property to only hold with high probability. In this relaxed
model, we are able to design approximate profit maximizing auctions and
approximately efficient auctions. We generalized these results to give a
methodology for designing collusion resistant mechanisms for single
parameter agents.
In addition, we give several results for a weaker incentive property from
the literature known as *group strategyproofness*.
This is joint work with Andrew Goldberg.
Operations Research Colloquia: http://or.stanford.edu/oras_seminars.html